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Non-technical Summary 
This report examines the employment and hours impacts of the 1999 introduction of the UK 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) and the 2016 introduction of the UK National Living 
Wage (NLW) in Northern Ireland (NI) using Labour Force Survey data. Because NI is a 
relatively low-wage region of the UK we might expect minimum wages to have more impact 
on employment and hours in NI than in other parts of the UK. NI is also the only part of the 
UK with a land border – the border between NI and the Republic of Ireland (RoI) – where the 
NMW and NLW cover those working on one side of the border but not those working on the 
other side of the border. This discontinuity in minimum wage coverage enables a research 
design that estimates the impacts of the NMW and NLW by comparing changes in 
employment and hours north and south of the border around the time of the NMW and NLW 
introductions. In practice we estimate a number of alternative models using this approach. 
Although no existing study of minimum wage impacts has previously exploited this particular 
border, there is a long tradition of estimating minimum wage impacts in this way, particularly 
within the US where the minimum wage varies across states and even within states.   
We find a small decrease in the employment rate of 22-59/64 year olds in NI, of up to two 
percentage points, in the year following the introduction of the NMW. The estimates at the 
upper end of this range are statistically significant at conventional levels and are consistent 
with a non-trivial, negative employment effect of the NMW, although other potential 
explanations (e.g. employment impacts of the appreciation of sterling relative to the euro 
during 1999 or of faster economic growth in the RoI relative to NI during 1999), for at least 
part of this effect, cannot be entirely ruled out. Estimates at the lower end of this range, from 
models which make more conservative assumptions at the risk of potentially underestimating 
the impact of the NMW, are typically not statistically significant, i.e. we cannot be confident 
they do not show zero impact.  
We find no evidence of an impact of the introduction of the NLW on employment in NI, and 
no evidence of impacts of either the NMW or NLW introductions on weekly hours worked in 
NI, regardless of the particular model estimated; estimates tend to be very small in magnitude 
and everywhere statistically insignificant. 
In presenting new (albeit tentative) evidence of a possible negative employment effect of the 
introduction of the NMW in 1999 in a low-wage region, this report adds to the small group of 
existing UK studies to have found similar employment effects among particular low-wage 
groups of workers or in particular low-wage sectors. The conclusion of the UK literature to 
date – that there has been no overall negative employment effect of the NMW at the national 
level – should be tempered by these low-wage group, sectoral and regional exceptions. In 
presenting new evidence of zero employment and hours impacts of the 2016 introduction of 
the NLW in NI, however, this report shows that the possible negative employment impact of 
the introduction of the original NMW in NI was not repeated in 2016, despite NI’s continuing 
position as a relatively low-wage UK region. The report thus also makes a timely additional 
contribution to the body of research on which the Low Pay Commission can draw in making 
recommendations regarding the NLW going forward. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of whether minimum wages, and minimum wage increases, lead to falls in 
employment and/or hours worked continues to attract significant interest among both policy 
makers and researchers. It is particularly pertinent in the UK, and especially at the current 
time, given the recent introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW) for those aged 25 and 
over and its planned uprating to reach 60% of national median wages over the next few years. 
The April 2016 introduction of the NLW was itself a big change, corresponding to an 
overnight increase of 7.5% in the minimum wage rate for the 25+ age group, or an increase in 
the bite of the UK minimum wage for the relevant age group from 52.5% of the UK median 
wage at the April 2015 NMW mid-year point to an estimated 55.8% by the October 2016 
NLW mid-year point (Low Pay Commission, 2016).  
There is an extensive international body of evidence on the employment and hours effects of 
minimum wages, employing a range of methods in a range of contexts and coming to a 
variety of conclusions. Even reviews of this literature have drawn mixed conclusions (e.g. 
contrast Neumark & Wascher (2006) with Schmitt (2013)). Nonetheless, inasmuch as there is 
a consensus in the international literature it is probably that the employment and hours effects 
of modest minimum wage increases are typically small. UK evidence points to a similar lack 
of employment and hours responsiveness to minimum wage increases overall, although there 
is some evidence of impacts for some particular groups and sectors (e.g. see the reviews of de 
Linde Leonard et al., 2014; Low Pay Commission, 2016).  
This report examines the employment and hours impacts of two key UK minimum wage 
policy changes, specifically for Northern Ireland (NI): (i) the original introduction of the 
NMW in April 1999 and (ii) the introduction of the NLW for 25s and over in April 2016. Our 
motivation for focusing on NI is threefold. First, NI is a relatively low-wage region where 
minimum wages have more bite. For example, the bite of the NLW in NI in mid-year 2016 
was already estimated to be well over 60%, and the second highest of all the UK regions 
(Low Pay Commission, 2016). If, as seems to be the case from the existing body of research 
in the UK and internationally, employment and/or hours effects of minimum wages are partly 
dependent on the extent to which such minimum wages bite, then such effects may be more 
likely in NI than in higher-wage regions of the UK. Second, NI is the only part of the UK 
where there is a jurisdictional border reflected in a substantial discontinuity in minimum 
wage rates but (arguably) a reasonable degree of labour market comparability otherwise, at 
least in terms of changes over the periods of interest, i.e. the land border with the Republic of 
Ireland (RoI). This enables a quasi-experimental approach to estimating NMW and NLW 
impacts on employment and hours which exploits the RoI as a comparison group. Third, 
despite the potential for minimum wage impacts on employment and hours in NI, there is no 
existing study that seeks to estimate such effects against a defined counterfactual. In all three 
respects this report makes a contribution to the wider empirical literature on minimum wages 
and, potentially, also to contemporary UK policy advice regarding minimum wage impacts.  
Specifically, for both the NMW and NLW introductions we conduct a difference-in-
differences analysis of the employment and hours impacts of the NMW and NLW 
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introductions, with the RoI as the main comparison group, exploiting comparable cross-
sectional unit record data available quarterly in both jurisdictions from the Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey (QLFS) (NI) and the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) (RoI). The 
RoI did not introduce a national minimum wage until April 2000, and more recently, the 
introduction of the NLW in NI in April 2016 was not echoed by any contemporaneous 
increase in the RoI minimum wage, although the RoI increased its own national minimum 
wage on 1
st
 January 2016. Before and after periods for this quasi-experimental approach are 
therefore defined as in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: The Introduction of the NMW and NLW as Natural Experiments 
 Before After 
NMW Introduction, 22+ 1998Q2-1999Q1 1999Q2-2000Q1 
  NI Minimum Hourly Wage n/a £3.60 
  RoI Minimum Hourly Wage n/a n/a 
NLW Introduction, 25+ 2015Q4-2016Q1 2016Q2-2016Q3 
  NI Minimum Hourly Wage £6.70 £7.20 
  RoI Minimum Hourly Wage €8.65 (2015Q4),  
€9.15 (2016Q1) 
€9.15 
Note: In sensitivity analysis we also explore exclusion of 2015Q4 – see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for further 
discussion – in the ‘before’ period for the introduction of the NMW.  
 
We find a small decrease in the employment rate of 22-59/64 year olds in NI, of up to two 
percentage points, in the year following the introduction of the NMW. The estimates at the 
upper end of this range are statistically significant at conventional levels and are consistent 
with a non-trivial, negative employment effect of the NMW, although other potential 
explanations (e.g. employment impacts of the appreciation of sterling relative to the euro 
during 1999 or of faster economic growth in the RoI relative to NI during 1999), for at least 
part of this effect, cannot be entirely ruled out. Estimates at the lower end of this range, from 
models which make more conservative assumptions at the risk of potentially underestimating 
the impact of the NMW, are typically not statistically significant, i.e. we cannot be confident 
they do not show zero impact. Further, we find no statistically significant impacts of the 
introduction of the NLW on employment in NI, and no clear impacts of either the NMW or 
NLW introductions on weekly hours worked in NI.  
In presenting new (albeit tentative) evidence of possible negative employment effects of the 
NMW this report adds to the small group of existing UK studies to have found similar 
employment effects among particular low-wage groups of workers or in particular low-wage 
sectors (Machin et al., 2003; Dickens et al., 2015). In presenting evidence of zero 
employment and hours impacts of the introduction of the NLW in NI, despite the relatively 
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high bite of the NLW in the region, this report also makes a timely addition to the body of 
research on which the Low Pay Commission can draw in making recommendations regarding 
the NLW going forward.  
The remainder of this report is set out as follows. The following section presents a brief 
review of relevant empirical literature on the employment and hours impacts of minimum 
wages in particular for the UK. We also discuss studies of RoI minimum wage effects and the 
very limited existing literature on minimum wage impacts in NI. Section 3 presents a brief 
comparative discussion of labour markets north and south of the border, discusses the data 
used in the analysis, and the approach to estimation of the minimum wage impacts adopted. 
Section 4 presents a preliminary descriptive analysis of hourly wages, employment rates and 
hours in NI over the time periods either side of both reforms, comparing informally to similar 
outcomes over the same period in GB (wages) and RoI (employment and hours). Section 5 
presents and discusses the formal difference-in-differences analyses, including an exploration 
of heterogeneous treatment effects by gender, age and education level, and sensitivity 
analyses for the main estimates. Section 6 concludes. An Appendix provides further data 
details and additional estimates.  
 
2. Existing Research 
Economic theory is ambiguous about the employment and hours impacts of minimum wages 
because predicted effects depend on the market context in which they are introduced. As 
pointed out by Butcher (2012), in a perfectly competitive labour market theory suggests that 
firms would reduce the amount of labour employed through reductions in employment (the 
extensive margin) or hours (the intensive margin) or both in response to a minimum wage set 
above the market-clearing wage. In contrast, in a monopsonistic labour market, or a labour 
market where higher wages induce greater productivity through efficiency wage effects, 
theory suggests that minimum wages may even have a positive impact on employment or 
hours.  
This theoretical ambiguity is one of the factors that have led to a vast international empirical 
literature on the employment and hours effects of minimum wages, employing a range of 
methods in a range of contexts – although much of it focussed on the US – and coming to a 
variety of conclusions (the latter being another factor in the literature’s longevity). Some 
early studies found negative employment effects (e.g. Brown et al., 1982; Neumark et al., 
2004), while others (notably Card and Krueger, 1994; also Card et al., 1994) found positive 
employment effects. Even reviews of this literature have drawn mixed conclusions (e.g. 
contrast Neumark & Wascher (2006) with Schmitt (2013)). Inasmuch as there is a consensus 
in the international literature, however, it is probably that employment effects of modest 
minimum wage increases are typically small. Although fewer studies examine hours, there is 
perhaps slightly more weight of evidence of negative hours effects among low-paid workers 
in the US (e.g. see Couch & Witttenburg, 2001; Belman et al., 2015), but again there are 
counter-examples (e.g. Zavodny, 2000). 
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UK evidence points to a similar lack of employment responsiveness to minimum wage 
increases overall, although there is some evidence of impacts for some particular groups (see 
Dickens et al. (2015) on part-time women), particular sectors (see Machin et al. (2003) on the 
residential care sector) and again on hours (see Stewart & Swaffield, 2008). Reviews of this 
literature are provided by de Linde Leonard et al. (2014) and various Low Pay Commission 
reports (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2016). Because the UK minimum wage was introduced at 
the same time across the whole country, and has subsequently been uprated across the whole 
country at the same points in time, UK researchers have had to be creative to generate 
plausible counterfactuals by which to identify employment and hours effects. Among the 
more credible methods employed are difference-in-differences comparing low-wage workers 
with those higher up the wage distribution (e.g. Stewart, 2002) and regression discontinuity 
comparing outcomes either side of age thresholds (e.g. Dickens et al., 2014).  
Very little is known about the impact of the NMW or NLW on employment and hours 
specifically in NI. We know from UK-wide analysis that the bite of the NMW and NLW is 
higher in NI than most other regions of the UK (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2016), a fact that 
has been exploited for identification of its impacts by a number of the studies cited above, 
starting with Stewart (2002). There is also a descriptive statistical report by the relevant NI 
government department, published in autumn 2016 following the introduction of the NLW, 
which estimates the number of workers likely to be affected by the NLW introduction and 
how this varies across groups and sectors (Department for the Economy, 2016). It uses 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data from 2014/15 to estimate that around 8% 
of employees in NI were likely to be directly affected by the introduction of the NLW, with 
disproportionate impacts on female workers, part-time workers, young workers (aged 25-34) 
and those in certain sectors, reflecting the wider variations in bite at the national level. This 
report, however, does not consider impacts on employment or hours.  
It is also the case that very little is known with regard to the impact of the minimum wage in 
RoI on outcome variables such as hours worked or employment.  Nolan et al. (2002), which 
collected longitudinal data on a sample of firms in Ireland in 1998 and 2001 to assess the 
impact of the 2000 introduction of the RoI minimum wage on employment, found no impact 
with respect to employment growth at a general level, but a lower rate of employment growth 
among the very small percentage of firms employing high proportions of workers covered by 
the new minimum wage.  Forthcoming research by McGuinness and Redmond adopts a 
difference in difference framework to analyse the impact of the NMW increase from €8.65 to 
€9.15 in January 2016. They find that while the rate rise had no detectable impact on 
employment, it did result in a reduction of 1 hour per week in the number of hours worked. 
The fall in hours worked was particularly pronounced, at -3.5 hours, among minimum wage 
workers on temporary contracts.   
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3. Methodology  
3.1 Comparison of Labour Markets North and South of the Border 
Despite their geographical proximity, the labour markets on both sides of the Irish border are 
quite distinct in terms of some of their core characteristics.  The RoI labour market has been 
subject to much higher levels of economic volatility, due principally to the highly open nature 
of the Irish economy; in contrast the NI labour market is generally perceived as being less 
subject to national and international shocks, due to its heavier reliance on public sector 
employment. Public sector jobs are estimated to account for over 30 per cent of total 
employment in NI, compared to a UK average of 17 per cent (Flynnn, 2015) and a figure of 
18 per cent for RoI (OECD)
1
.  The NI labour market is also a relatively poor regional 
performer within a UK context; while NI unemployment rates follow the UK trend, they 
typically lie above the UK average irrespective of the business cycle position. Whilst a high 
reliance on the public sector has helped insulate the NI labour market against external shocks, 
the RoI economy has experienced some remarkable shifts in fortune that have resulted in 
large movements in unemployment, employment and migration following the very high 
growth rates during the late 1990s and early 2000s and, again, during the global downturn 
period of 2008 to 2012
2
. The more open nature of the RoI labour market is apparent from the 
more pronounced swings in both unemployment and net migration, relative to NI, over the 
1998 to 2016 period (Figures 1 and 2).  Migration represents an important safety valve for the 
Irish labour market (Bergin & Kelly, forthcoming) helping to dampen wage inflation during 
periods of growth and unemployment during recessions.  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that labour market conditions in both regions were relatively stable and similar, in terms of 
both unemployment and net migration, during the time points of key importance to our study 
i.e. 1999 and 2016. We will demonstrate this further in the next section through more detailed 
comparisons of key labour market trends over in the periods immediately preceding the 
introductions of the UK NMW and NLW. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 OECD Government at a Glance (2013). 
2
 Growth rates in real GDP averaged nine per cent between 1997 and 2000 before moderating to five percent 
between 2001 and 2007 (Barret & McGuinness (2012).  
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rates for Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland 
 
Source: CSO(RoI) and NISRA (NI). Notes: ROI figures relate to July. NI figures relate to May-July averages. 
 
 
Figure 2: Net Migration for Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland 
 
Source: CSO(RoI) and NISRA (NI). 
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3.2 Data  
We exploit unit record data drawn from two national, representative, quarterly household 
surveys – the QLFS and the QNHS – which we treat as repeated cross-sections. Both surveys 
provide detailed information for large samples of individuals in identified households 
quarterly from 1998Q2 through to the latest available quarter, with the QLFS sample size 
large enough to make quarterly analysis specifically for NI feasible, at least overall if not for 
narrowly-defined sub-groups. Once we restrict samples to working age individuals – age 22-
25/64 for the introduction of the NMW and 25-59/64 for the introduction of the NLW – we 
are left with quarterly sample sizes of around 2,700 for NI around the introduction of the 
NMW and around 1,700 for NI around the introduction of the NLW.  The equivalent QNHS 
sample sizes for the RoI are around 55,000 per quarter around the introduction of the UK 
NMW and around 21,000 per quarter around the introduction of the UK NLW.    
To analyse the introduction of the NMW in April 1999 there are four quarters of data 
available both pre-treatment (from 1998Q2-1999Q1) and post-treatment (from 1999Q2-
2000Q1), from both surveys, where no other minimum wage changes took place either in NI 
or RoI (2000Q2 saw the introduction of the Republic of Ireland’s own minimum wage.) This 
is our window of observation for the NMW analysis described in the following sections. The 
usable window of observation around the introduction of the NLW in April 2016 is narrower 
for two reasons. First, the UK (including NI) uprated the NMW in October 2015 and again in 
October 2016, although the latter change did not directly affect those aged 25+ given the 
NMW rate still fell below the NLW rate. Second, there was a large increase in the RoI 
minimum wage from 1
st
 January 2016 (from €8.65 to €9.15). In what follows we restrict our 
analysis to data drawn from the two quarters prior to the NLW introduction and the two 
quarters following its introduction, i.e. from 2015Q4 to 2016Q3, although we test sensitivity 
to further restrictions given the potentially confounding other minimum wage changes in this 
case.  
Because the QNHS evolved from the RoI’s own LFS there is a high degree of compatibility 
between the two data sources, both of which use similar sampling frames and contain 
information on economic activity, hours worked and other job characteristics, as well as some 
demographic and household characteristics. Note, however, that the QNHS has very limited 
information on pay – household income bands only – so hourly pay / wage data cannot be 
derived for the RoI from this source.   
The key outcome variables we use in the descriptive and/or econometric analysis are as 
follows: 
Hourly wage (QLFS only): We use two measures of hourly pay: HOURPAY and HRRATE. 
The former is derived by ONS from hours and earnings data recorded elsewhere in the QLFS 
survey, has good coverage for those in employment, and is available for analysis of both the 
introduction of the NMW and the introduction of the NLW. The trade-off for its good 
coverage is noise. As a result studies specifically of the wage effects of UK minimum wage 
upratings have tended to use data from the ASHE (see Low Pay Commission, 2016). An 
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alternative variable available in the QLFS since spring 1999 – so available for analysis of the 
wage effects of the introduction of the NLW but not the NMW – is HRRATE, which refers to 
the basic hourly rate of respondents whose last pay period was less than monthly. This 
restriction, and the fact that it is asked in all quarters but only for respondents who are in the 
first or last wave of their five-quarter rotation in the QLFS sample, means coverage is far less 
complete than in the case of HOURPAY. The trade-off for lower coverage is an hourly wage 
measure that is perceived by some to be more accurate than HOURPAY (e.g. Ormerod and 
Ritchie, 2007). 
Employment: To measure whether an individual is employed during the reference period we 
use the standard ILO definition as in the QLFS variable ILODEFR and the QNHS variable 
ILO. Note that, because they cannot be reliably separately identified in the QNHS, the self-
employed – not covered by the NMW or NLW – are included along with employees here.  
Weekly hours worked: We focus primarily on total usual weekly hours in the main job, 
including overtime. The relevant variable in the QLFS (QNHS) is TTUSHR (HWUSUAL). 
We also provide estimates for total actual hours worked in the last week (TTACHR / 
HWACTUAL), although this measure is complicated by zeroes for those on holiday or off 
work for other reasons in the previous week.  
Employment in a minimum wage sector: The absence of wage data in the QNHS means we 
are limited in our ability to restrict analysis to those most likely to be affected by the 
minimum wage, i.e. the low paid. Instead we define an additional outcome variable over 
those employed that seeks to exploit the concentration of minimum wage workers in certain 
sectors. Specifically, we define ‘employed in a minimum wage sector’ as being employed in 
wholesale and retail, food and accommodation, and health and social care. We also separately 
examine hours impacts of the NMW and NLW among those employed in these sectors. 
These variables, along with all the controls we use in the econometric analysis, are listed and 
defined in Table A1.  
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics – sample means and proportions and standard 
deviations for continuous variables – for the respondents north and south of the border, 
before and after both reforms. In most respects the composition of the NI and RoI samples 
appears very similar. Where there are differences – whether reflecting genuine differences in 
outcomes or characteristics, or differences in the precise definition of variables or 
categorisation of responses between the two surveys – e.g. in average actual weekly hours 
around the introduction of the NMW or in education levels around the introduction of the 
NLW, they are time-invariant over the period under consideration, and therefore will not 
confound estimated NMW/NLW impacts. Note the three percentage point increase in the 
employment rate in the RoI between the pre-NMW and post-NMW periods, however, which 
is not reflected in an increased employment rate in NI. Also note the large increases in 
employment rates for 18-21 (18-24) year olds in the RoI over the period of the introduction of 
the NMW (NLW), again not reflected in NI. We return to these points below.  
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Table 2: Sample Means / Proportions (Standard Deviations) for Outcomes and Other 
Observable Characteristics, NI and RoI, Pre and Post Introduction of NMW 
 
NI RoI 
 
1998Q2-
1999Q1 
1999Q2-
2000Q1 
1998Q2-
1999Q1 
1999Q2-
2000Q1 
Hourly wage (£, HOURPAY) 7.14 
(4.07) 
 
7.45 
(4.17) 
- - 
Employment rate 22-59/64 0.70 
 
0.70 0.69 0.72 
Proportion of employed in minimum wage 
sector 
0.31 0.30 0.19 0.19 
Employment rate 18-21 
 
0.60 0.59 0.52 0.56 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 34.6 
(18.0) 
 
35.0 
(17.9) 
40.4 
(14.8) 
40.1 
(14.5) 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
 
39.6 
(13.5) 
 
39.5 
(13.9) 
39.1 
(12.7) 
38.7 
(12.0) 
Proportion of employed in minimum wage 
sector 
0.31 0.30 0.26 0.26 
Employment rate 18-21 
 
0.60 0.59 0.52 0.56 
Male 0.51 
 
0.51 0.52 0.52 
Age, years 40.0 
(11.3) 
 
40.2 
(11.2) 
39.7 
(11.3) 
39.8 
(11.3) 
Single 0.27 
 
0.27 0.32 0.33 
Married / cohabiting 0.63 
 
0.63 0.62 0.61 
Widowed/divorced 0.05 
 
0.05 0.06 0.06 
No. children <18 in household 1.07 
(1.27) 
 
1.04 
(1.26) 
1.09 
(1.32) 
1.05 
(1.29) 
Nobs 11,366 11,552 220,795 219,934 
Note: Estimates are weighted for non-response using pwt07 (QLFS) and gf (QNHS) and based on the full set of 
information available for each variable. Variables are defined in Table A1.  
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Table 3: Sample Means (standard deviations) for Outcomes and Other Observable 
Characteristics, NI and RoI, Pre and Post Introduction of NLW 
 
NI RoI 
 
2015Q4-
2016Q1 
2016Q2-
2016Q3 
2015Q4-
2016Q1 
2016Q2-
2016Q3 
Hourly wage (£, HOURPAY) 12.82 
(7.03) 
 
12.35 
(5.92) 
 
- - 
Hourly wage (£, HRRATE) 9.23 
(3.27) 
 
9.71 
(3.65) 
 
- - 
Employment rate 25-59/64 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 32.5 
(16.6) 
 
33.6 
(16.7) 
 
35.6 
(13.0) 
 
36.8 
(12.8) 
 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
 
37.5 
(12.1) 
 
37.6 
(12.6) 
 
36.5 
(11.6) 
 
36.8 
(11.4) 
 
Proportion of employed in minimum wage 
sector 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.32 
Employment rate 18-24 0.58 0.59 0.44 0.49 
Male 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 
Age, years 43.0 
(10.7) 
 
43.1 
(10.7) 
 
42.5 
(10.4) 
 
42.5 
(10.4) 
 
Single 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.35 
Married / cohabiting 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.58 
Widowed/divorced 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
No. children <18 in household 0.91 
(1.12) 
 
0.90 
(1.13) 
 
0.97 
(1.20) 
 
0.96 
(1.20) 
 
ISCED1 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.06 
ISCED2 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.12 
ISCED3-4 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.15 
ISCED5 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 
ISCED6 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.30 
Nobs 3,430 3,832 42,170 41,961 
Note: Estimates are weighted for non-response using pwt16 (QLFS) and gf (QNHS) and based on the full set of 
information available for each variable. Variables are defined in Table A1.   
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3.3 Approach to Estimation  
In common with many previous studies of minimum wage effects internationally, including 
the seminal study of Card and Krueger (1994), differences across space are exploited here to 
identify impacts on employment and hours. In particular differences in the timing of the 
introduction and uprating of the NMW, NLW in NI and their counterpart in the RoI are 
exploited here. The NMW and NLW introductions north of the border are, in effect, treated 
as natural experiments – individuals in NI are the treatment group and individuals in RoI are 
the control group – and their impacts estimated using a standard difference-in-differences 
approach (see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). Specifically, linear regressions of the 
following form are estimated:  
𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼𝑁𝐼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿(𝑁𝐼𝑖. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 (1) 
  
where, 
𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the outcome variable of interest (employment or hours) for individual i in country c at 
time t; 
𝑁𝐼𝑖 is a dummy for individuals living in a household within Northern Ireland; 
𝜆𝑡 are quarterly fixed effects common to both NI and RoI;  
𝛿 is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), averaged over all post-reform periods;  
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable for whether the quarter is in the post-reform period (i.e. post 
NMW or post NLW); 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains individual and household observed characteristics;  
and 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a stochastic error term capturing other influences, which we allow to be clustered 
at the NUTS 3 regional level in a sensitivity analysis. 
For (log) hours we estimate the model by ordinary least squares (OLS) and 𝛿 gives the 
percentage change in average hours among the NI sample driven by the NMW or NLW 
introduction. For employment, where the outcome is binary, for ease of interpretation we also 
estimate by OLS (in this case as a linear probability model (LPM)). In this case 𝛿 is 
interpreted as the impact of the NMW or NLW introduction on the probability of 
employment among the NI sample. We also explore sensitivity of the key employment 
estimates to adopting a logit specification, in which case we present marginal effects of the 
NMW or NLW introduction on the probability of employment which are interpretable in the 
same way. 
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Because minimum wage impacts on employment or hours may not be instantaneous and may 
vary over the post-reform period, we also estimate an extended version of (1) which allows 
for dynamic treatment effects as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼𝑁𝐼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑝(𝑁𝐼𝑖. 𝑝)
𝑄
𝑝=1
+ 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 (2) 
  
where 𝑝  is a series of quarter dummy indicators for each of the post-reform quarters.  
A crucial identifying assumption using difference-in-differences estimation is that the 
treatment and control groups are following parallel paths, also known as common trends, 
which in this case means that in the absence of the introduction of the NMW or NLW in NI, 
outcomes would have followed a path that is parallel to that observed in RoI. While this 
assumption is untestable, the standard procedure in the literature is to check the plausibility of 
the assumption by testing whether the treatment and control group outcomes at least follow 
parallel paths prior to the reform. One potential driver of diverging prior trends is anticipation 
effects in NI following the announcement of – June 1998 and July 2015 respectively – but 
ahead of the implementation of the NMW/NLW. There are also other potential drivers which 
we discuss below.  
An informal sense of whether the outcomes of interest here – employment and hours – were 
diverging prior to the introductions of the NMW and NLW is given by Figures 6-9 in the 
following section. Diverging trends can be more formally tested, however, by estimating the 
dynamic model over the pre-reform period, similar to equation (2), except 𝑝 is a series of 
quarterly dummy indicators for each of the pre-reform periods. This is straightforward for the 
introduction of the NMW – both jurisdictions had no minimum wage in the four quarters (or 
before) prior to 1999Q2, and RoI didn’t introduce its minimum wage until 2000Q2. It is less 
so for the introduction of the NLW in 2016Q2 because the RoI minimum wage was uprated 
from €8.65 to €9.15 in 2016Q1. Nevertheless we examine the two quarters prior to 2016Q2 
on the assumption that the changes in employment and hours in the RoI induced by the 
uprating of the ROI minimum wage in 2016Q1 were negligible. McGuinness and Redmond 
(forthcoming) provide support for this assumption in the case of employment, although they 
cannot rule out an hours impact of the January 2016 uprating of the RoI minimum wage.   
Estimated coefficients and standard errors for NI-quarter interactions in each case (i.e.  𝛿𝑝) 
and p-values for the corresponding tests of their joint significance are presented in Table 4. In 
neither case – the introduction of the NMW and the introduction of the NLW – is there 
evidence of statistically significant diverging prior trends for employment or for hours. We 
therefore proceed, at least initially, on the basis that the assumption of common trends holds 
in all cases here. The estimates in Table 4 can also be interpreted as null estimates for placebo 
tests in each of the quarters prior to the actual introduction of the NMW and NLW.   
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Table 4: Testing for Parallel Prior Trends – Difference-in-difference Estimates for the Pre-
treatment Periods, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
𝛿𝑝 Employment Weekly hours 
Introduction of the NMW   
1998Q2 ref. case ref. case 
1998Q3 -0.014 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
   
1998Q4 -0.003 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
   
1999Q1 -0.016 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
 
  
𝐹𝛿1998Q3=𝛿1998Q4=𝛿1999Q1=0 [p-value] 0.83 
[0.48] 
0.97 
[0.41] 
   
Nobs 232,161 139,351 
 
Introduction of the NLW    
2015Q4 ref. case ref. case 
2016Q1 -0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
   
Nobs 45,600 30,703 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. These represent coefficients on interaction 
terms between the dummy variable for NI and individual quarter dummies. All models are estimated with a full 
set of controls (as listed and defined in Table A1).   
 
Having said that, Table 4 does suggest some prior divergence in employment (possibly 
growing faster in the RoI than NI prior to the NMW) and hours (possibly growing faster in 
NI than RoI prior to the NMW with the opposite being the case just prior to the NLW, despite 
the possible hours effect of the RoI minimum wage uprating in 2016Q1) although too small 
and imprecisely estimated to be statistically significant at conventional levels. To explore 
sensitivity to the common trends assumption we therefore also report estimates based on an 
alternative assumption of parallel growth, i.e. estimates that allow for diverging linear trends 
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(see Mora and Reggio, 2012). In practice this entails inclusion of a NI-specific linear time 
trend in (1) as an additional control variable. That estimated minimum wage effects can be 
sensitive to the inclusion of such trends has been demonstrated in previous studies (e.g. 
Allegretto et al., 2011), although some question how to interpret such sensitivity (e.g. 
Neumark, 2017).  
We also estimate alternative models comparing outcomes in NI with those in Great Britain 
(GB) in place of the RoI, comparing outcomes within NI for 22/25-59/64 year olds with those 
for 18-21/24 year olds, and exploiting the three-way difference between the younger and 
older age groups north and south of the border. None of these robustness tests are ideal, 
however, given the NMW was introduced simultaneously in GB and NI, given that the NMW 
also covered 18-21 year olds albeit at a lower rate, and given the rapid growth in youth 
employment in the RoI around the introduction of both the NMW and NLW (see Tables 2 
and 3), likely reflecting the particular sensitivity of youth employment to the rapid growth 
south of the border at the time of the introduction of the UK NMW and to the recovery from 
the Great Recession at the time of the introduction of the NLW. Specifically, all are likely to 
underestimate any negative minimum wage impacts on employment or hours. Finally, we 
also estimate models for NMW and NLW impacts on employment and hours in the three one-
digit industries likely to have the highest concentrations of minimum wage workers both 
north and south of the border (wholesale & retail trade, accommodation & food, and human 
health & social work), for which we can also reject diverging prior trends.
3
  
Even with parallel prior trends, parallel assumptions may still be violated if there are 
confounding sources of divergence in the quarters coinciding with or immediately following 
the NMW/NLW introductions. There are potential candidates for such confounders. The NI 
and RoI economies were growing at very different rates around the time of the introduction 
of the NMW, with real GDP and GNP growth rates of between 8% and 10% in RoI in 1998 
and 1999 (in part reflecting expansionary monetary policy associated with the launch of the 
Euro, e.g. with a 50 basis point cut in April 1999) compared to growth in NI GVA of only 
0.1% in 1998 and 4.3% in 1999, with the more rapid NI growth in 1999 in part reflecting the 
peace dividend following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The rapid growth in the 
RoI at this time may be partly reflected in the increased employment rate between the pre and 
post-NMW periods shown in Table 2. On the other hand this growth disparity was at its 
widest in 1998 where we find no evidence of diverging trends in employment or hours. 
Nevertheless, because we cannot entirely rule out that employment rates would have diverged 
north and south of the border over the year following the introduction of the NMW even in 
the absence of its introduction, we must remain cautious about interpreting any estimated 
negative employment effect from our main model as causal; such an estimate is more likely 
to be an upper bound on the absolute magnitude of any negative NMW effect. There was also 
a steady appreciation of Sterling relative to the Euro over the course of 1999 (of around 
10%), which may have led to changes in cross-border shopping and tourism, or changes in 
employment in export industries either side of the border. If these currency-related potential 
confounding effects impart a bias on our main NMW employment estimate it is also likely to 
                                                          
3
 Results for testing divergence of prior trends in these cases are available from the authors on request.  
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take a negative sign, reinforcing the likely interpretation of this main estimate as an upper 
bound on the absolute magnitude of any negative NMW effect on employment. It is less clear 
how these potential confounders would bias estimated hours impacts of the NMW. For both 
outcomes this provides further motivation for the battery of sensitivity analyses set out in 
Section 5.3.   
The RoI and NI were also growing at different rates in the period around the NLW 
introduction, with faster growth in the RoI compared to steady growth of around 2% in GVA 
for NI.
4
 The introduction of the NLW also broadly coincided with the Brexit referendum in 
the UK, with the surprise ‘leave’ result declared at the end of 2016Q2 quickly followed by a 
dip in business and consumer confidence – although these subsequently recovered and GDP 
growth in the UK (and to a lesser extent NI) remained strong throughout 2016 – and a large 
depreciation of the £/€ exchange rate (by over 10% during the fortnight from 23rd June to 7th 
July 2016, with further falls over the course of 2016Q3). The Brexit vote is also likely to 
have impacted on RoI over the second half of 2016, in part but not only through the changes 
in the £/€ exchange rate, although GDP growth remained strong over the second half of the 
year. Given the mixed nature of these potential confounders, however, it is less 
straightforward to sign any potential bias on the estimated NLW impact on employment, and 
again on hours
5
, in this case. Again we rely in part on the sensitivity analysis set out in 
Section 5.3 to draw conclusions on the extent to which these issues may be biasing our main 
estimates of NLW impacts.  
Another necessary condition to correctly identify the impacts of the NMW/NLW introduction 
using this kind of regression approach is that there are no large, relevant, asymmetric, 
unobserved changes in the composition of the working age population or, for hours, in the 
composition of those in employment. We know from Tables 2 and 3, however, that 
observable characteristics of the treatment and control groups are stable between the pre and 
post-reform periods in each case. It is not unreasonable to therefore assume the absence of 
large compositional changes in unobservables.  
Finally, although substantial changes in cross-border migration as a result of the introductions 
of the NMW and NLW seem unlikely and there is no documented evidence of such, we 
cannot entirely rule out the potential for spillover effects associated with cross-border 
commuting ex ante. For example substantial commuting from RoI to NI could potentially 
lead to estimated employment / hours effects of the NMW/NLW introduction that are biased 
towards zero (e.g. consider an extreme example where half of those employed in NI commute 
in from the RoI and therefore are recorded not in the QLFS but in the QNHS). It is also 
possible that commuting patterns may have been directly affected by the introduction of the 
NMW/NLW – although the larger exchange rate movements are likely more salient – which 
could lead to biases of uncertain sign. Unfortunately there is insufficient information on 
                                                          
4
 For RoI 2015 growth in total consumption of 4.5% is probably a better reflection of the situation than 
estimated GDP growth of 26%. RoI GDP growth in 2016 was estimated at 5.2%. 
5
 An exception is that the hours impact of the January 2016 uprating of the RoI minimum wage reported by 
McGuinness and Redmond (forthcoming) would bias the estimated hours impact of the NLW towards zero.  
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cross-border commuting in the QLFS and QNHS for a detailed analysis of such impacts.
6
 In 
none of the quarters analysed here, however, does reported cross-border commuting ever 
exceed one percent of the relevant age group.  
 
4. Descriptive Analysis  
Before turning to the formal difference-in-differences analysis comparing NI and RoI 
described above, we take a preliminary look at the QLFS and QNHS data to see if there is 
any evidence of changes in employment rates or average hours in NI that are potentially 
consistent with NMW or NLW effects.  
First however, given that the primary mechanism for minimum wages to impact on 
employment or hours is through their impacts on actual wages paid to workers, we explore 
whether the QLFS suggests any change in the hourly wage distribution in NI that coincides 
with the introduction of the NMW or NLW. In other words we look for changes consistent 
with ‘first stage’ effects of the NMW or NLW. For the introduction of the NMW we are 
limited to using the HOURPAY variable in the QLFS which ONS derives from data on 
reported hours and earnings (see Section 3.2). For the introduction of the NLW we use both 
HOURPAY and the alternative HRRATE, which although reported for far fewer survey 
respondents, is likely to be more accurate for those that do report it (again see Section 3.2). 
Because the QNHS does not report wage data for RoI, in this case we compare NI and GB. 
Figures 3-4 show the proportion of workers paid below the NMW according to the 
HOURPAY measure (Figure 3) and the proportion of workers paid below the NLW 
according to the HOURPAY and HRRATE measures (Figures 4 and 5 respectively), for both 
NI and GB, over the relevant periods. For both charts using the HOURPAY variable there is 
no clear change in either NI or GB coinciding with the introduction of the NMW or NLW.
7
 
Instead, around the introduction of the NMW the proportion of workers recorded as being 
paid below the NMW follows a reasonably steady downward trend in both GB and NI with 
no apparent acceleration in its rate of decline in the run up to 1999Q2. Similarly, there 
appears to be a falling proportion paid below the NLW in both GB and NI in the two quarters 
preceding its introduction in 2016Q2, which then levels off for GB from 2016Q2 but 
continues to decline for NI through 2016Q3. (The series for NI appears particularly noisy 
over this period.) In contrast, Figure 5 shows a clear drop in the proportion of workers paid 
below the NLW in both GB and NI in 2016Q2 when using the HRRATE measure, of a 
                                                          
6
 Data on cross-border commuting is very limited in both the QLFS and QNHS. In the QLFS there is a question 
on whether the individual’s usual place of work is outside the UK (REGWKR) but if so there is no information 
on the country of work. Even if we proceed under the assumption that anyone living in NI whose usual place of 
work is outside NI is working in RoI, very few respondents ever report that they work outside of NI in any of 
the quarters analysed here, which raises both reliability and potential disclosure issues. The QNHS data is 
similarly sparse, although commutes to NI are identified separately from commutes to other parts of the UK (the 
relevant variable is UKCOUNTRYW).   
7
 Note that Figure 3 appears to underestimate the proportion of workers paid below the minimum wage as of 
April 1999 compared to an ASHE-based figure cited in LPC (2016) that suggests 3.4% of UK workers were 
directly affected by the NMW at the time of its introduction.   
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similar magnitude in both GB and NI, although from a slightly higher starting point in NI. 
From 2016Q2 onwards the proportion in both GB and NI is, as we would expect if there is 
almost complete compliance, very close to zero (less than 0.2%). In other words, the 
HRRATE measure if not the HOURPAY measure suggests clear first stage effects of the 
introduction of the NLW in both GB and NI. We are left uncertain as to the first stage effects 
of the original introduction of the NMW.  
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Workers Paid Below £3.60, NI and GB, HOURPAY Wage Measure 
 
Source: QLFS 1998Q2-2000Q1. Notes: Weighted; age 22-59 (women) and 22-64 (men).  
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Figure 4: Proportion of Workers Paid Below £7.20, NI and GB, HOURPAY Wage Measure 
 
Source: QLFS 2015Q3-2016Q4. Notes: Weighted; age 25-59 (women) and 25-64 (men).  
 
Figure 5: Proportion of Workers Paid Below £7.20, NI and GB, HRRATE Wage Measure 
 
Source: QLFS 2015Q3-2016Q4. Notes: Weighted; age 25-59 (women) and 25-64 (men).  
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Figures 6-7 show trends in the employment rates for both NI and RoI over the relevant 
periods. Figure 6 shows a clear, steady upward trend in employment in the RoI over the 
period 1998Q2-2000Q1. The NI data are noisier, as we would expect given the smaller 
sample size, but approximately track the upward trend for the RoI over the period prior to the 
introduction of the NMW, consistent with Table 4. As of 1999Q2, however, the two series 
clearly diverge, with the NI employment rate growing only slowly through to 2000Q1 
compared to rapid ongoing growth in the RoI. From an essentially zero gap on average over 
the period prior to the NMW, a gap of around two percentage points emerges by 2001Q1. 
This is consistent with an employment effect of the NMW, although as already discussed 
there may be other explanations.  
Figure 7 suggests that there is no such apparent impact on the NI employment around the 
time of the NLW introduction; the NI employment rate remains essentially flat throughout 
the period leading up to and following the introduction of the NLW whereas the RoI 
employment rate grows steadily over the period.  
 
Figure 6: Employment Rate, NI and RoI, 1998Q2-2000Q1 
 
Source: QLFS and QNHS 1998Q2-2001Q1. Notes: Weighted; age 22-59 (women) and 22-64 (men).  
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Figure 7: Employment Rate, NI and RoI, 2015Q1-2016Q3 
 
Source: QLFS and QNHS 2015Q1-2016Q3. Notes: Weighted; age 25-59 (women) and 25-64 (men).  
 
Figures 8-9 show trends in average weekly total usual hours worked in both NI and RoI over 
the relevant periods. The data are noisy (and seasonal), but in the earlier period (Figure 8) 
average hours in NI are shown to be higher than those in the RoI by around half an hour per 
week. They were also flatter prior to the NMW introduction than in RoI where average hours 
were falling. Following the introduction of the NMW average hours initially rise in NI before 
falling from their peak in 1999Q3, and continue to fall, albeit slowly, in the RoI. In short, 
there is little evidence here of a clear NMW effect on hours. Figure 9 shows that average 
hours in NI were also higher than those in the RoI in the period around the introduction of the 
NLW, and in this case neither NI nor the RoI show any clear trend either before or after its 
introduction. Again there is little evidence here of any NLW impact on hours.  
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Figure 8: Average Total Usual Weekly Hours, NI and RoI, 1998Q2-2000Q1 
 
Source: QLFS and QNHS 1998Q2-2001Q1. Notes: Weighted; age 22-59 (women) and 22-64 (men). 
 
Figure 9: Average Total Usual Weekly Hours, NI and RoI, 2015Q1-2016Q3 
 
Source: QLFS and QNHS 2015Q1-2016Q3. Notes: Weighted; age 25-59 (women) and 25-64 (men).  
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5. Difference-in-differences Analysis 
5.1 Main Estimates 
Table 5 presents our main difference-in-difference estimates of the employment and hours 
impacts of the introduction of the NMW in NI using the RoI as the comparison group. Only 
the key estimated parameters are reported here; full results are given in the appendix.
8
 First 
consider employment. The first row gives the estimated impact of the NMW introduction on 
employment, averaged over the first four quarters following its introduction. The estimate 
suggests that the NMW was associated with a fall in employment in NI, with employment in 
the year following its introduction almost two percentage points lower than we estimate 
would otherwise have been the case. This is broadly similar in magnitude to the negative 
impact of the NMW introduction on employment retention of part-time women (three 
percentage points) reported by Dickens et al. (2015), and corresponds to around 20,000 
individuals (out of a working age population of approximately one million) who might 
otherwise have been in employment.  
 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
  Employment Weekly hours 
   Constant treatment effect (1999Q2-2000Q1) -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
   
Time-varying treatment effect 
  1999Q2 -0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
   
1999Q3 -0.014 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
   
1999Q4 -0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
   
2000Q1 -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
 
  
   Nobs 463,647 298,473 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 are included in the model and full estimates for the constant treatment effects models are presented 
in Table A2. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 We do not separately discuss estimated correlations between employment and control variables here, which are 
consistent with what we would expect in all cases. 
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Given the earlier discussion about possible confounding trends, how do we interpret this 
estimate? We know from Table 4 that we can reject diverging prior trends, which strengthens 
the case for interpreting this as a causal effect of the NMW introduction.
9
 But we also know 
that we cannot entirely rule out confounders in the year following the introduction of the 
NMW, which on balance suggest this estimate may be an upper bound on any ‘true’ causal 
impact of the NMW on employment. We investigate this further by subjecting the model to a 
range of sensitivity analyses, as discussed in Section 5.3.  
The next four rows of Table 5 present quarter-specific estimates of NMW impacts on 
employment. Three out of four are statistically significant at conventional levels, and the 
magnitudes of these estimates are reasonably stable around the -1.9 percentage point average, 
with at most a slight trend increase in the estimated NMW impact on employment over the 
year, consistent with the NMW impacting in part via employment growth (see Meer and 
West, 2016).
10
  
Turning to estimated impacts of the NMW on hours (column 2 of Table 5) we see no clear 
evidence of any impact. The estimated impact averaged over the first year following the 
NMW introduction is essentially zero in magnitude and is nowhere near statistical 
significance. Neither is there any clear estimated impact in the quarter-specific estimates, all 
of which are statistically insignificant and range in magnitude from +0.013 to -0.015.  
How sure can we be that these estimates are showing a zero impact of the NMW on hours? 
Again we know from Table 4 that we can reject diverging prior trends, although if anything 
in this case there appears to be a slight (although statistically insignificant) growth in hours in 
NI relative to the RoI over the period prior to the introduction of the NMW that could, if 
continued into the post-NMW period, bias any estimated negative hours effect towards 
zero.
11
 We also cannot entirely rule out confounders in the year following the introduction of 
the NMW, although in this case it is less straightforward to sign any potential bias (faster 
growth in the RoI could lead to increased hours among those already in work but could also 
draw previously non-employed workers into the labour market, some of whom may work 
part-time). As for employment, to increase confidence in this zero estimate we subject the 
model to a range of sensitivity analyses as discussed in Section 5.3.  
Table 6 repeats the exercise for the introduction of the NLW in 2016Q2. In this case there is 
very little evidence of any NLW impact on employment in NI, with the point estimate very 
close to zero and nowhere near statistical significance. As shown by rows 2 and 3, neither is 
there any evidence of an employment effect that accumulates – via employment growth – 
over time following the NLW introduction, although the caveat here is that we have data for 
only two post-NLW quarters. Again, how sure can we be that these estimates are showing a 
                                                          
9
 A more exacting test on prior trends is to estimate the model over the whole sample period with both pre and 
post NI-specific dummies (with the former defined as =1 for 1998Q3-1999Q1 and =0 otherwise) and to test 
whether the estimated coefficients on the pre*NI and post*NI dummies are equal. We reject the null hypotheses 
(of equal coefficients) at the 99% level of statistical significance.  
10
 An alternative explanation for larger point estimates in later quarters is ongoing diverging trends. 
11
 In this case, however, we cannot reject that the estimated coefficients on the pre*NI and post*NI dummies are 
equal when we repeat the test described in footnote 9 (p-value of 0.85).  
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zero impact of the NLW on employment? We know from Table 4 that we can once again 
reject diverging prior trends.
12
 We cannot entirely rule out confounders in the two quarters 
following the introduction of the NLW, although in this case, as for hours following the 
introduction of the NMW, it is less straightforward to sign any potential bias (for example, 
any confounding effect of currency movements over this period seem likely to work in the 
opposite direction to any confounding effect of more rapid growth in the RoI). Again, to 
increase confidence in this zero estimate we subject the model to a range of sensitivity 
analyses as discussed in Section 5.3.  
Similarly, for hours, there is no clear evidence here of any impact from the introduction of the 
NLW. The point estimate in the first row suggests a decrease of around one percent in 
average usual weekly hours in the six months following the introduction of the NLW but the 
estimate is not precise and is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The quarter-
specific estimates are also statistically insignificant, although the estimate for 2016Q3 is 
larger in magnitude at -1.9%, and is approaching the margin of conventional levels of 
statistical significance. This raises the question of whether NLW impacts on hours might 
emerge in subsequent quarters as more data become available. In terms of confidence in this 
zero estimate, as before we can rule out statistically significant prior diverging trends
13
 but 
not potential confounding effects in the period immediately following the introduction of the 
NLW, biases from which are difficult to sign. Again our approach is to subject the estimate to 
sensitivity analysis, as set out in Section 5.3.  
 
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NLW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
  Employment Weekly hours 
   Constant treatment effect (2016Q2-2016Q3) -0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
   
Time-varying treatment effect 
  2016Q2 -0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
   
2016Q3 0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.013) 
   
 
   
Nobs 91,393 61,550 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 are included in the model and full estimates for the constant treatment effects models are presented 
in Table A3. 
                                                          
12
 Further, we cannot reject that the estimated coefficients on the pre*NI and post*NI dummies are equal when 
we repeat the test described in footnote 9 (p-value of 0.83).  
13
 Again we cannot reject that the estimated coefficients on the pre*NI and post*NI dummies are equal when we 
repeat the test described in footnote 9 (p-value of 0.97). 
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5.2 Heterogeneous Minimum Wage Effects?  
Table 7 presents the key parameters from re-estimating (1) on subsamples split by gender, 
age and education level (the latter only for the introduction of the NLW given unavailability 
of data for the earlier period in the QNHS). There is no evidence of heterogeneity in the 
employment effect of the introduction of the NMW; the estimated two percentage point 
decline in the employment rate is common to men and women and to the younger and older 
age groups (although the latter is a very broad grouping). Similarly the estimated zero 
impacts of the NLW on employment, and of both the NMW and NLW on hours, are common 
to men and women, older and younger workers, and lower and higher-qualified workers; all 
estimates, for all groups, are statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW and NLW Introductions 
on Employment and Hours in NI, Heterogeneous Effects, Constant Treatment Effects, 
Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
 
NMW Introduction NLW Introduction 
  
Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
     Baseline -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.001 
(0.007) 
 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
 
Men -0.020** 
(.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
     
Women -0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.018) 
     
Age 22-34 / 25-34 -0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.020 
(0.019) 
     
Age 35-59/64 -0.019*** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
     
Higher qualification level 
- - 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
     
Lower qualification level 
- - 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
     
     ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 – with the exception of the relevant dummy on which the sample is restricted – are also included in 
each model. The models are estimated under the parallel paths assumption in each case.  
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5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Table 8 presents the key parameter estimates from a number of sensitivity analyses.  
First we re-estimate the employment models as logit models rather than LPMs, given the 
binary nature of the outcome variable.  
Second, we include a linear trend term for NI to control for diverging trends that do not reach 
the threshold for statistical significance. To the extent that this is over-controlling, these 
estimates are likely to be on the conservative side.  
Third, we re-estimate the main model excluding the quarter prior to the NMW and NLW 
introductions in each case to test sensitivity to possible anticipation effects.  
Fourth, we re-estimate the main model excluding 2015Q4 in the NLW case to test sensitivity 
to potential effects of the RoI uprating of its own minimum wage on1st January 2016.  
Fifth, we re-estimate hours effects using total actual hours in the reference week rather than 
total usual hours.  
Sixth, we restrict the QNHS sample to those in the NUTS3 border region in an effort to 
minimise potential asymmetric shocks.  
Seventh, we exclude the RoI border region in an attempt to minimise the scope for biases 
from cross-border spillovers.  
Eighth, we replace the RoI as the control group with a control group drawn from the QLFS 
for GB. Although GB and NI both introduced the NMW, and later the NLW, at the same 
time, this approach aims to exploit the contrast in bite in both the NMW and NLW between 
NI and GB to identify its impacts. But, as for the estimates including a linear trend for NI, 
these are likely to be conservative estimates because we cannot rule out minimum wage 
impacts in the control group too.  
Ninth, we replace the RoI as the control group with a control group drawn from within NI but 
for a younger age group (18-21s in the case of the NMW and 18-24s in the case of the NLW). 
Again these are likely to be (very) conservative estimates because the younger age groups are 
also covered by the NMW, albeit at lower rates, and we cannot rule out that employment 
and/or hours for these younger age groups react more strongly to minimum wages than those 
for the older age groups. This is likely to be a bigger issue for the introduction of the NMW 
than the NLW because the adult and youth rates were introduced simultaneously for the 
former whereas the NMW rate for under-25s was constant over the period of analysis around 
the introduction of the NLW.  
We then estimate a triple differences version of the model which exploits both the age 
dimension and the NI/RoI dimension for identification of NMW and NLW impacts. In other 
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words it is the difference in relative employment and hours changes between the older and 
younger age groups north and south of the border that are exploited for identification. Again 
this is likely to lead to (very) conservative estimates of any negative NMW/NLW impacts on 
employment – it is less clear in the case of hours – given the rapid growth in youth 
employment in the RoI around the introduction of both the NMW and NLW, which because 
it most likely reflects the particular sensitivity of youth employment to wider economic 
conditions in RoI, would be unlikely to carry over to NI under the counterfactual.  
Next, we re-estimate the main models allowing standard errors to be clustered at the NUTS3 
level using a wild cluster bootstrap approach (with 1000 draws) as suggested by Cameron and 
Miller (2015).
14
  
Finally, we also re-estimate the main models specifically for NMW and NLW impacts on 
employment and hours in the three one-digit industries likely to have the highest 
concentrations of minimum wage workers both north and south of the border (wholesale & 
retail trade, accommodation & food, and human health & social work).
15
 These are the 
sectors arguably most likely to experience minimum wage employment and/or hours effects.  
Forthcoming research from Maitre et al. compares the sectoral distribution of minimum wage 
workers in RoI and the UK in 2014 using EU-SILC data. Maitre et al. (forthcoming) found 
that the proportions of minimum wage workers employed in the three identified sectors in 
RoI and the UK  stood at 58 and 55 per cent respectively. NI-specific analysis also shows 
these sectors to have high concentrations of minimum wage workers (Department for the 
Economy, 2016). 
Table 8 shows that the estimates presented in Table 6 for the employment and hours effects 
of the introduction of the NLW are highly robust; for each outcome the estimates from the 
wide range of variants of the model and/or sample are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero in all but one case. The exception for employment is the triple differences model 
exploiting variation by age group and either side of the Irish border, with the positive 
employment estimate likely explained by the confounding effect of rapid growth in young 
adult employment in the RoI as the economy continued to recover from the deep recession 
following the financial crisis. For hours the exception is the estimate with clustered standard 
errors, which although identical in magnitude to the baseline estimate with robust standard 
errors, is now estimated to be statistically significant at conventional levels given the 
bootstrapped clustered standard errors are smaller than in the baseline case. In neither case is 
this evidence convincing enough to overturn the baseline estimate of zero NLW impacts on 
employment and hours. The same holds – in this case with no exceptions – for the estimated 
hours impact of the introduction of the NMW, which is robustly zero.  
 
 
                                                          
14
 The wild bootstrap approach is warranted because of the potential downward bias of standard cluster-robust 
error estimates when the group size is small. In this case the number of groups is nine.   
15
 Recall that wage data are not available in the QNHS so we cannot restrict our analysis to low-paid workers 
explicitly; instead we attempt to proxy concentration of low-pay workers using sectoral variation in wages.  
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Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis, Constant Treatment Effects, Coefficients (Robust St. Errors) 
 
NMW Introduction NLW Introduction 
  
Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
     Baseline -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
     
Baseline as logit (m. effects) -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
 
- -0.0002 
(0.011) 
- 
Including linear trend for NI -0.006 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
     
Exclude 1999Q1 -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
- - 
     
Exclude 2015Q4 - - -0.00001 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
     
Exclude 2016Q1 - - -0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
     
Total actual hours - -0.005 
(0.008) 
- -0.018 
(0.012) 
     
Border regions only -0.010 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.015) 
     
Exclude border regions -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
     
GB as control group -0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
     
18-21 / 18-24 as control group, 
NI only 
0.032 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.042) 
     
Triple difference by age and 
country 
0.038* 
(0.021) 
-0.019 
(0.033) 
0.056* 
(0.030) 
0.038 
(0.045) 
     
Estimated with wild-bootstrap 
clustered st. errors [p-value] 
-0.019*** 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.656] 
-0.001 
[0.600] 
-0.011*** 
[0.002] 
     
Employed in minimum wage 
sector 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
     
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Covariates listed in Table A1 are included in 
each model. Wild-bootstrap standard errors are clustered at the NUTS 3 regional level.  
31 
 
 
 
In contrast, the estimated employment effect of the introduction of the NMW is more 
sensitive to variations in sample and model specification, as we might expect from the earlier 
discussion of potential confounders. The baseline estimate of a two percent decline in 
employment is robust to estimating as a logit model rather than an LPM, to exclusion of 
1999Q1, to exclusion of the RoI border region, and, in terms of statistical significance (the 
coefficient estimate is identical), to re-estimating with wild cluster bootstrapped standard 
errors. It is robust in sign (i.e. negative), but smaller in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant, in most other cases. In particular, for three important sensitivity analyses – the 
model including a linear trend for NI, the model with GB as the comparison group in place of 
the RoI, and the model estimating impacts on the employment share in minimum wage 
sectors – the introduction of the NMW is estimated to reduce the employment rate in NI by 
less than one percentage point, with none of these estimates statistically significant. We have 
already argued that the first two of these estimates are likely to be on the conservative side, so 
arguably by themselves do not provide convincing evidence of a zero employment of the 
NMW in NI.  The third estimate, however, more strongly suggests that at least part of the 
baseline estimated NMW impact on employment – a part that is substantial enough to make 
the difference between statistical significance and statistical insignificance – may be driven 
by confounding trends post-treatment rather than the NMW itself. On the other hand this can 
only be interpreted as a rough proxy for low-wage employment, and we also estimate larger 
and statistically significant impacts on this particular outcome measure for two important 
subgroups: males and 22-34s.
16
 The positive estimated employment effects for the model 
comparing age groups within NI and the triple differences model – statistically insignificant 
in the first case but not the second case – likely reflect NMW impacts on the younger age 
group in NI and the confounding trend increase in youth employment in the RoI discussed 
above. Neither estimate provides convincing evidence to either reject or further support the 
baseline estimate.  
  
6. Conclusions 
This report presents estimates of employment and hours impacts in NI of the introductions of 
the UK NMW and NLW, using the RoI – where minimum wages were not introduced until 
2000Q2 and were constant at the time of the introduction of the NLW – to generate the 
relevant counterfactuals in each case. It is the first study to exploit the UK’s only land border 
in order to identify minimum wage effects and the first study to estimate minimum wage 
impacts on employment and hours in NI – one of the lowest-wage regions of the UK – 
against a defined counterfactual.  
We find that the NMW is associated with a small decrease in the employment rate of 22-
59/64 year olds in NI, of up to two percentage points, in the year following its introduction. 
The estimates at the upper end of this range are statistically significant at conventional levels 
                                                          
16
 The relevant estimates (robust standard errors) are -0.024*** (0.009) and -0.033*** (0.013), respectively.  
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and are consistent with a non-trivial, negative employment effect of the NMW, although 
other potential explanations, for at least part of this effect, cannot be entirely ruled out. 
Estimates at the lower end of this range, from models which make more conservative 
assumptions at the risk of potentially underestimating the impact of the NMW, are typically 
not statistically significant, i.e. we cannot be confident they do not show zero impact of the 
NMW on employment.  
We (robustly) find no evidence of an impact of the introduction of the NLW on employment 
in NI in the six months following its introduction, and no evidence of impacts of either the 
NMW or NLW introductions on weekly hours worked in NI. 
In presenting new (albeit tentative) evidence of a possible negative employment effect of the 
introduction of the NMW in 1999 in a low-wage region, this report adds to the small group of 
existing UK studies to have found similar employment effects among particular low-wage 
groups of workers or in particular low-wage sectors. The conclusion of the UK literature to 
date – that there has been no overall negative employment effect of the NMW at the national 
level – should be tempered by these low-wage group, sectoral and now possibly regional 
exceptions. In presenting new evidence of zero employment and hours impacts of the 2016 
introduction of the NLW in NI, however, this report shows that any negative employment 
impact of the introduction of the original NMW in NI was not repeated in 2016, despite NI’s 
continuing position as a relatively low-wage UK region. These latter estimates are more in 
line with the bulk of the literature on the UK minimum wage providing estimates at the 
national level.  
We conclude with two potential takeaways for the Low Pay Commission in its deliberations 
on the NMW and NLW going forward, albeit takeaways that are subject to the various 
caveats concerning internal validity discussed throughout this report, as well as the usual 
caveats concerning external validity. First, because neither the introduction of the NMW nor 
the introduction of the NLW impacted on average hours worked in NI, this report provides no 
additional reasons to expect that a further modest increase in the NLW would reduce average 
hours in NI. Second, because the evidence of overall employment impacts of the NMW and 
NLW in NI is more mixed – no impact of the introduction of the NLW but a possible 
negative impact of the introduction of the NMW – this report provides no unambiguous 
message on whether a further modest increase in the NLW would reduce employment in NI. 
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Appendix: Further Data Details and Additional Results 
Table A1: Variable Definitions and Descriptions 
Variable Definition Description 
Outcome Variables   
Hourly wage (£, HOURPAY) 
 
 
 
Hourly wage (£, HRRATE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employment  
 
 
Employment in minimum wage sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 
 
 
 
 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
Average gross hourly 
pay 
 
 
Basic hourly rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employed in the 
reference week 
 
Those employed in 
the reference week in 
sectors with high 
concentrations of 
minimum wage 
workers 
 
Total actual hours 
worked in main job in 
the reference week 
including overtime 
 
Total usual hours 
worked in main job 
including overtime 
Pay in pounds per hour of work, 
derived from earnings and 
hours data 
 
Basic reported pay in pounds 
per hour of work for those on 
hourly rate or paid more 
frequently than monthly. Only 
asked for wave 1 and 5 
respondents. 
 
Employed in the reference 
week = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Employed in the following 
sectors: UK SIC07 G, I & Q =  1, 
0 if employed in other sectors* 
 
 
 
 
This variable is constructed 
from TTACHR from the QLFS 
and HWACTUAL from QNHS 
 
 
This variable is constructed 
from TTUSHR from the QLFS 
and HWUSUAL from QNHS 
   
Controls   
Male 
 
Age, years 
 
 
Age squared 
 
 
Single 
 
 
Married/cohabiting 
 
 
Sex of respondent 
 
Age of respondent in 
years 
 
Age of respondent in 
years, squared 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is single  
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is married/ 
cohabiting 
Male = 1, female = 0 
 
Age of respondent in years 
 
 
Age of respondent in years, 
squared 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
single = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
married/ cohabiting = 1, 0 
otherwise 
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Widowed 
 
 
Divorced 
 
 
No. of Children under age of 18 in 
household 
 
 
No. of children under age 18 in 
household missing 
 
 
ISCED 1 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 2 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 3-4 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 5 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 6 
 
 
 
 
ISCED missing 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is widowed 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is divorced 
 
Number of children 
resident in the 
household 
 
Dummy for missing 
data on number of 
children <18 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as No 
Qualifications or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as GCSEs 
(NI) / Junior 
Certificate (RoI) or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as A-
Level (NI) / Leaving 
Certificate (RoI) or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as sub-
Degree level Higher  
or Further Education 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as 
Degree level or higher  
 
Dummy for missing 
data on highest 
qualification level 
 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
widowed = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
divorced = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Number of children under the 
ages of 17 (RoI) and 19 (NI) 
resident in the household 
 
Missing =1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
ISCED1 = 1, 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED2 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
ISCED3/4 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
ISCED5 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED6 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
Missing =1, 0 otherwise 
 
Note: * SIC Codes: G=Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles; I=Accommodation &  
food services activities  and  Human Health &  social work activities. 
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Table A2: Full Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
 Employment Weekly Hours 
NI*Post -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
NI 0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
1998Q3 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
1998Q4 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
1991Q1 0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q2 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q3 0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q4 0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
2000Q1 0.038*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.029*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Age
2
 -0.0005*** 
(0.00001) 
-0.00006*** 
(0.00001) 
Male 0.263*** 
(0.001) 
0.350*** 
(0.002) 
No. children <18 in 
household 
-0.044*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
Married 0.044*** 
(0.002) 
-0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Divorced -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.096*** 
(0.005) 
Widowed -0.028*** 
(0.006) 
-0.102*** 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.226*** 
(0.010) 
3.42*** 
(0.011) 
R
2
 0.135 0.146 
Nobs 463,647 298,473 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. 
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Table A3: Full Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NLW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
 Employment Weekly Hours 
NI*Post -0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
NI 0.040*** 
(0.007) 
0.055*** 
(0.009) 
2016Q1 -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
2016Q2 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
2016Q3 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.061*** 
(0.006) 
Age 0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Age
2
 -0.0004*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00002) 
Male 0.129*** 
(0.003) 
0.299*** 
(0.004) 
No. children <18 in 
household 
-0.038*** 
(0.001) 
-0.029*** 
(0.002) 
Married 0.119*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
Divorced -0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
Widowed -0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.049** 
(0.025) 
ISCED6 0.213*** 
(0.004) 
0.079*** 
(0.005) 
ISCED5 0.161*** 
(0.005) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
ISCED3-4 0.094*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
ISCED2 -0.028*** 
(0.005) 
-0.036*** 
(0.007) 
Constant -0.004 
(0.028) 
3.02*** 
(0.038) 
R
2
 0.099 0.085 
Nobs 91,393 61,329 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. 
 
 
